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Abstract 
 This study was performed with the goal of observing the effect, if any, that security 
fatigue has on students’ perceived strength of passwords. In doing so, it was hoped to find some 
correlation between the two that would help in establishing a measurable effect of the 
phenomenon in students. This could potentially aid organizational decision-makers, such as 
security policy writers and system admins, to make more informed decisions about implementing 
security measures. To achieve the goal of observing this fatigue and attempting to measure it, a 
survey was distributed to numerous students on the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 
campus. The results of the final data analysis show no correlation between security fatigue and 
students’ perceived password strength, but other findings of note did emerge. Notably, both 
fatigue-state groups of students showed very close mean scores for perceived password strength, 
with those scores indicating a higher trust in the strength of passwords than is actual. This result 
implies a lack of influence from security fatigue, as well as a general deficiency in students’ 
abilities to properly judge the strength of passwords. 2-Factor Authentication is thus proposed as 
a primary item of interest for addressing this deficiency and meeting the needs of students with 
varying priorities according to their fatigue state.  
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I – Introduction 
 In today’s technologically advanced society there is seldom a time to let your guard 
down. With computing devices being ever-present in the form of cell phones, smartphones, 
computers, tablets, and more, humanity is more connected than ever. However, any computer 
expert, or even general user, can tell you that such a vast amount of interconnectivity brings its 
own host of problems. For instance, Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations Report for 2020 [1] 
showed that two cyber threats implicated in data breaches, those being phishing and the use of 
stolen credentials, appeared only slightly less between 2019 and 2020 while still taking the top 
spots for threats among those breaches; they are affectionately referred to by the authors as “our 
old foes.” Threats like these may be well known and expected now, but their continued 
prevalence in real cyber-attacks indicates they are still a serious risk. When users are told to 
engage in a protective mindset and behavior against these threats, day in and day out, even when 
the threats seem distant or unlikely to affect them personally, that is when users’ willingness to 
participate in those protective practices dwindles. 
 This effect has already been documented by others [2] and coined as “Security Fatigue.” 
It is a kind of mental fatigue that pertains to the user’s unwillingness to adhere to security-
minded actions and behaviors, though according to Steven Furnell and Kerry-Lynn Thomson, it 
is more of a gradual depreciation of security compliance than outright rebellion against it. Those 
actions and behaviors include things such as keeping a computer system updated, being cautious 
of malicious emails, and changing one’s password on time, to name a few. The last item, 
passwords, in conjunction with security fatigue, will be the focus of this paper. Specifically, this 
work is to find what effect- if any- security fatigue has on the perceived strength of passwords. 
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The study will be performed on a collection of survey responses from a university student 
population. The broad outline of this chapter is described thusly:  
(1) The Background of the Problem, which will explain the origins and context of the problem 
on which this study is based. (2) The Problem Statement, which will identify the problem. (3) 
The Purpose of the Study, which will elaborate on the research objectives and means of 
achieving them. (4) The Population of the Study, which will speak about the group from which 
data for this thesis was collected. (5) The Significance of the Study, which will outline the ways 
in which this thesis is unique and contributes meaningful information to the field of 
cybersecurity, or wherever else it is pertinent. (6) The Nature of the Study, which will provide an 
overview of the methodology and justification. (7) The Research Question/Hypotheses, which is 
fairly self-explanatory. (8) The Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations, which will state 
any prior assumptions about the outcome/data that may have been present, any limitations to the 
design and/or execution of the various processes of the study, and what limits on the scope and 
generalizability of the project may exist. Finally, a (9) Chapter Summary will summarize key 
points and takeaways from the introduction. 
Background of the Problem 
 When it comes to research studies, there are two types that are commonly used: 
quantitative and qualitative. The former is mainly useful for answering the “how many” and 
“how much” questions and has many advantages for the researcher [3]. To name just a few, data 
for these studies can be collected quickly, and it is both independent of the researcher and 
numerical, making it easily validated. For instance, identifying the number of soda cans sold 
across many locations can indicate where hotspots of soda drinkers are present, thus enabling the 
soda company to direct supply where the demand is highest. That is of course a very trivial form 
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of quantitative research, but it exemplifies how a qualitative method is useful. On the flipside, 
qualitative research provides different kinds of insights that aren’t necessarily so universal, but in 
many ways more useful within a defined context. 
Say that the same soda company wanted to improve one of their product lines after 
reporting a decrease in sales. A quantitative study of why people don’t like the drink would not 
be very useful. Given that quantitative studies are based on numbers and measurable things that 
should be able to exist in a generalized, contextless sense- at least after analysis, then it stands to 
reason that applying the methods of a quantitative study to a question that is inherently based on 
individual context is wrong. If the study designers only intended to ask about certain measurable 
aspects of the product- sugar content, carbonation level, etc.- or wanted to know about all 
measurable aspects of it, then they could perhaps attempt a quantitative study outright, but in the 
former situation they would be biased in choosing aspects and may miss the root cause of the 
issue, and the latter situation could drive away respondents with the great length and complexity 
of the data collection tool- a survey, most likely.  
Alternatively, they could choose to solicit open-ended responses from the customers with 
just one or a few questions, such as “How could we improve (insert drink here)?” While 
responses from such a question are not strictly measurable and require more subjective 
interpretations, the smaller number of questions would likely encourage higher response rates 
because of the shorter time investment and better respondent focus on the issues most pressing to 
them, their “emic” or insider viewpoint [3]. The onus is then on the researcher to properly 
analyze the responses for keywords, phrases, and the like, which can be turned into a quantitative 
study assuming appropriate interrater reliability [4] when coding or due diligence in ensuring 
credibility of a single coder and validity of their work [5]. 
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 All of this is to say that quantitative and qualitative studies each have their own purposes. 
The first provides insights through statistical analysis that are more uniformly interpretable, 
acceptable, and actionable, at the cost of sometimes missing important context that could help 
explain the human side of a problem. The second provides rich details and important context that 
can be lost in a general study, at the cost of being more subjective and less verifiable. Where this 
applies to security fatigue is in the lack of quantitative information. 
Problem Statement 
 The problem that drives this study is a lack of empirical data on the effects of security 
fatigue. Studies involving security fatigue thus far have used it in a qualitative manner- for 
instance, identifying whether it seems to exist- without trying to make any quantitative 
connection between the fatigue and its alleged effects. This is somewhat reasonable given that 
drawing conclusions between qualitative and quantitative data can dilute the value of the latter 
with the subjectivity of the former, however, considering the increasingly digitized nature of 
everyday life in the modern world- especially following the Covid-19 pandemic, understanding 
more about the factors that impact cyber security efforts is paramount, especially for one that is 
tied closely to the implementation of those efforts. 
Purpose of the Study 
 For this study, both qualitative and quantitative data will be collected through an online 
survey and analyzed in conjunction with each other to determine: Whether security fatigue may 
be present in a respondent, and whether it has a consistent effect on the perceived strength of 
passwords. Additionally, recommendations on how to interpret and use the findings of this study 
will be provided. This study is being performed in the Southeast United States in the city of 
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Chattanooga, Tennessee, locally based out of and on the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 
(UTC) campus. 
Population and Sample 
 The population from which the sample used in this study was pulled is the student body 
of the UTC. The sampling type used in this study is homogenous convenience sampling due to 
the identity of all participants as students of the university, though varied disciplines are 
represented across the sample. This population was selected because of the many avenues for 
distribution that the author possessed. After the survey had concluded and non-viable responses 
were removed from the data set, 135 responses were recorded. 
Significance of the Study 
 This study takes a unique approach to security fatigue by attempting to go further than a 
qualitative analysis. By isolating responses that show signs of fatigue against those who do not 
and then examining password scores from both groups against each other, noteworthy 
differences may be found. The implications of this research are such that they could, in a limited 
sociodemographic capacity, identify a measurable correlation between security fatigue and 
students’ perceptions of password strength. This could provide previously unexplored insights 
and implications about the costs of security fatigue in a quantifiable manner, assisting policy 
writers, systems administrators, and universities in making the right decisions to offset any 
expected issues from the implementation of fatigue-causing security measures. Additionally, this 
study may help future research with a focus on, or relation to, security fatigue by opening new 
avenues of inquiry, such as an experiment to see which security measures have the greatest 
impact on users- for better or worse. 
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Nature of the Study 
 This will be a mixed method study using both quantitative and qualitative data to answer 
the presented questions and/or hypotheses. Given that- as previously elaborated on in the 
Background of the Problem section- qualitative studies are not ideal for presenting 
generalizations because of their low verifiability, and quantitative studies are not ideal for 
providing valuable context and human depth to data, an effort to reconcile them has been made 
by collecting both kinds of data alongside each other. This was deemed necessary in order to 
address the problem of the thesis, and according to prior research on mixed methods studies, 
“What is most fundamental is the research question – research methods should follow research 
questions in a way that offers the best chance to obtain useful answers. Many research 
questions… are best and most fully answered through mixed research solutions.” [3] 
 Instrumentation for this study includes a two-section survey presenting both qualitative 
written response questions and Likert-scale quantitative questions. The former qualitative 
questions address the respondent about certain password practices and concepts, while the latter 
quantitative questions collect data on the respondent’s perception of password strength. The 
questions used in the written portion were adapted from a study performed by researchers at 
NIST, who were able to unintentionally elicit responses containing signs of security fatigue 
during interviews about online activity and cybersecurity [6]. Passwords were chosen as the 
litmus test for the quantitative portion because of their ubiquity in society, ensuring every 
respondent would be able to have an opinion on them. Passwords are partly chosen from a 
password breach list by a Python script, partly randomly generated using an online password 
generator, and partly chosen by hand because of unique qualities about them- such as character 
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replacement. Data analysis is performed in two parts, first through qualitative coding by hand, 
then a statistical analysis of the quantitative data using Microsoft Excel. 
Research Questions/Hypotheses 
This section details the research questions and hypothesis of this study. 
R1: Is security fatigue present in the sample? 
R1.1: What is the proportion of fatigued respondents to non-fatigued respondents? 
R1.2: Does the presence of security fatigue have a consistent, observable effect on the perceived 
strength of passwords? 
H1: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will be dominantly represented in the sample, such 
that the proportion of fatigued vs. non-fatigued respondents will be larger by some arbitrary 
amount. 
H2: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will have a negative impact on the perceived strength 
of passwords, i.e., those displaying signs of security fatigue will show a higher trust in weaker 
passwords overall than those who do not show fatigue. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
 It is assumed for this study that the selected population from which a sample was taken is 
fairly tech savvy and is knowledgeable of common cyber security concepts like threats (viruses, 
phishing) and security practices (password resets, lockouts, etc.). It is also assumed that the 
population lies between 17 and 25 years old, that being the rounded range for undergraduate 
students at UTC- the dominant category of students- according to 2019 demographic information 
[7]. 
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 Limitations of this study include the number of analysts available to look over the data, 
which was only the author of this thesis. This has implications for the trustworthiness and 
validity of the data collection and analysis, and as such it would have been preferable to have 
multiple people available to verify findings for such things as qualitative coding and tagging, but 
this was a constraint that had to be accepted given manpower availability. Additionally, being a 
mixed method study has implications for the generalizability of the findings. Given that 
quantitative data can often be statistically generalized to a population, while qualitative data is 
often only analytically generalized to a theory, the lesser scoped of the two (analytic) is likely to 
be the extent of this study’s generalizability, owing to its restricted scope and the type of data 
collection used [8]. 
 The research was deliberately delimitated to the geographic and demographic region of 
the UTC campus because of resource constraints on the author. Additionally, the variety of data 
collected by the survey was limited due to shared concerns between the author and thesis 
director, specifically regarding the sensitive topic of passwords and respondent anonymity. 
Open-ended questions were designed as carefully as possible in order to limit the chance of a 
personally identifying information (PII) leak in the responses, such as from a respondent 
interpreting a question about password practices to mean “Give them one of my passwords as an 
example.” This had the side-effect of leading to a very narrowly focused data set, and any 
demographics or social information about respondents- barring discipline- would have to be 
inferred from official UTC reports. 
Chapter Summary 
  Thus far, the concept of “security fatigue” has been introduced and defined as an 
unwillingness to adhere to security practices and behaviors, manifesting as a gradual 
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depreciation of compliance rather than outright rebellion [2]. There have been previous studies 
on the topic of security fatigue [2][6], but none have attempted to quantitatively analyze the 
phenomenon and its effects, which would be a useful extension of the literature for those in the 
position to be making security decisions or performing further research on that fatigue. Purely 
qualitative and quantitative studies have their advantages and disadvantages [3], but by 
combining them into a mixed methods study, greater depth and usefulness of the data can be 
generated. This could help bridge the gap between the concept of security fatigue and actionable, 
measurable data, again, given caveats about context. 
 To accomplish the goal of performing a mixed methods study, password strength ranking 
was chosen as the vehicle to drive quantitative analysis, while open-ended questions adapted for 
a focus on passwords were obtained from the literature [6] to perform qualitative analysis. 
Passwords were obtained from a variety of sources, including pseudo-random selection from a 
password breach list via a Python script, machine generation via a website, and a few hand-
picked passwords chosen for their unique characteristics- namely weak character replacement 
(P@ssw0rd, etc.). 
 Ultimately, this study is meant to answer the proposed research questions and approve or 
reject the hypotheses. It is desired to know whether the sample has shown any responses with 
signs of fatigue, and then if so, what proportion of the sample, and does security fatigue seem to 
have a consistent and measurable effect on those showing signs of fatigue? The expected effect 
is, of course, that fatigued respondents will consistently score weak passwords as stronger than 
they really are, and they will do so in higher numbers than the non-fatigued group does. It is also 
expected that fatigue will heavily tinge the data, being the dominant category in frequency. 
11 | P a g e  
 
 Whatever the outcome, the results will need to be interpreted from a geographic and 
sociodemographic context of undergraduate public university students in the Southeast United 
States, located specifically in Chattanooga, Tennessee at UTC [7]. Additional modifiers to the 
consideration of this research include the singular researcher performing data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation, the type of data collection performed (convenience), the 
questionable generalizability of the study beyond theory [8], and the constraints placed upon the 
instrumentation due to privacy concerns regarding password confidentiality and respondent 
anonymity. 
 In Chapter 2, a thorough review of the literature involved in the construction and guiding 
of this thesis will be performed. 
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II – Literature Review 
Previously, it has been discussed that the focus of this thesis is on the examination of 
security fatigue’s effects from a quantitative standpoint. It is understood that security fatigue is a 
gradual disillusionment from secure behavior and practices, though it is not related to an outright 
refusal of those two things from the very beginning. It was also discussed that perceived 
password strength was chosen as the mechanism by which quantitative effect would be 
correlated to the fatigue. This was decided on the basis that passwords are ubiquitous and most 
people understand topics related to them. The following sections will cover the literature picked 
to represent parts of this study, including the central premises of security fatigue, passwords, 
methodology, and research design.  
Title Searches and Documentation 
A specific-to-general approach was taken for searching out sources to inform the thesis- 
outside sources obtained from prior sources, and a variety of databases and search engines were 
utilized, including but not limited to: ScienceDirect, ProQuest Central, IEEE Xplore, UTC’s 
library, Google, and Google Scholar. Altogether, there are several categories that prior research 
used in this thesis could be lumped into: 
❖ Security Fatigue & Fatigue-related 
o The central premise that the study is based on, using a definition like that found in 
Steven Furnell’s work with NIST [2]. Additionally, any other relevant sources 
acquired through searches of this category may have been nominally related, such 
as articles on other forms of fatigue.  
o Keyword examples (in order of specific-to-general) 
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▪ “Security Fatigue,” Security Fatigue, password fatigue, information 
technology fatigue, security burnout, information technology burnout 
❖ Password Strength & Passwords 
o The quantitative component of the data collection instrument. This category 
includes works based generally around passwords, such as articles specifically on 
passwords or articles focused on password strength, making it a broad group.   
o Keyword examples (in order of specific-to-general) 
▪  Password strength, password complexity, password strength checker, 
passwords 
❖ Methodological & Research Design 
o Any articles to do with methodology or research design, such as data analysis, 
survey design, etc. Some overlap with other categories is present here, 
considering that the methodology of this study was adapted from prior work in the 
area. 
o Keyword examples (in order of specific-to-general) 
▪ Survey design, qualitative research, quantitative research 
Historical Content 
 As far as strictly historical content is concerned there is not much related to security 
fatigue as it is a relatively new concept. Having emerged from a study performed by researchers 
at NIST, “security fatigue” is defined by Steven Furnell and Kerry-Lynn Thomson as a situation 
wherein users “have actually been following good practice and then drift (or completely switch) 
into a mode in which they become tired or disillusioned with it.” [2] This central idea drives their 
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discussion on some possible causes of the fatigue, a hypothetical method to measure its severity, 
and then finally how to identify and potentially treat it. 
 Given the exploratory nature of the study and the topic it addresses, many of the ideas 
presented throughout it are difficult to approach through any lens but a conceptual one. Security 
fatigue itself is inherently a malleable condition, varying from one person to another in severity 
and ease of onset, as is noted by the authors. Additionally, their proposed equation for measuring 
its potential in a person is based on subjective variables like Effort, Difficulty, and Importance. 
Of course, none of it is meant to be taken as actionable theory, but it does a good job of 
establishing the core of what security fatigue is, why it exists, how to think about it, and the 
means by which it could be addressed. 
 The groundwork for security fatigue is set up as a people-problem, i.e., one that cannot 
easily be measurably represented. Indeed, the authors confirm that the necessity for measurement 
of the fatigue’s severity is questionable, given the difficulty of doing so and the suggested greater 
benefit of preventative care over waiting to judge the severity after an incident. It is for that 
reason that this thesis focuses more on the effects of the fatigue rather than the fatigue itself. 
Current work in the field has more to say on the fatigue itself, but that is a discussion for later. 
 Though it falls outside the current bounds of this research to measure fatigue’s varying 
levels of severity, which is information that would likely impact the findings of this thesis if it 
could be expanded, it has been suggested by previous works from Furnell and Thomson that such 
levels could exist. Interpreting their tiers of “user acceptance of IT” as levels of security fatigue, 
one can surmise that there is a positive and negative end of the spectrum that users can fall 
under, a security vigor and security fatigue scale if you will [9]. In their work, however, the scale 
was based on user acceptance levels, which could be used to determine when preventative action 
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is needed to ensure security compliant behavior. The parallels are obvious, though with some 
caveats. 
 There are eight levels suggested by the authors for interpreting user acceptance of IT, 
with the first four representing positive mindsets and the last four negative mindsets: Culture, 
Commitment, Obedience, Awareness, Ignorance, Apathy, Resistance, and Disobedience. From 
first to last, they represent a gradual decrease in security-minded behavior. When viewed from 
the angle of fatigue, the model for user acceptance works fairly well, though it does not account 
for the non-fatigued starting condition set by the authors in their later work- user was resistant 
from the start- or gray areas between Awareness and Ignorance as noted by the authors in the 
earlier article [9]. However, despite that shortcoming, it is a great way to visualize security 
fatigue in its more natural shades of gray form as opposed to true or false, given that each person 
will experience fatigue at a different level. 
Considering the knowledge about levels of security fatigue based on user acceptance, the 
fatigue’s effect on user behavior seems to escalate quickly, but the measurements of when a user 
reaches those levels is still not known. Considering modern knowledge from the authors is that 
measuring the severity level of the fatigue itself is not necessary. They serve best as a conceptual 
model to base reasoning off of for further qualitative study. However, if one is to take the 
proposed effects of the Disobedience and Ignorance levels as true possibilities for users on the 
scale, then there would be a vast difference in the effect on security effort efficacy around those 
users. Since one is not expected to solve the problem of quantifying the fatigue’s severity itself, 
then quantifying the effects of the fatigue is the best solution. With a large enough sample of 
fatigued and non-fatigued users, one could expect to find a correlation to tie to the worst level of 
fatigue and use as a baseline for future decision-making. Essentially, assume the worst to prepare 
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for the worst. The baseline found in that manner would give weight to the threat of security 
fatigue instead of leaving it as a vague threat. 
So thus far, it has been cleared up that it would be wise to focus on quantifying the 
effects of the fatigue rather than quantifying the severity of it. Passwords and their application in 
this regard will be covered in the next chapter, Methodology.  
Current Content 
 For current literature, there is a bit more to pull from, though the topic is still in its 
infancy and developing at this time. Arriving on the scene a few years after Furnell, Brian 
Stanton [6] from NIST proposed that security fatigue was a subset of decision fatigue. Using a 
previously collected dataset and coding it for fatigued responses, the researchers discovered a 
high number of their responses contained signs of security fatigue. Through previous work on 
mental models and the application of heuristics to security efforts, they were able to link security 
fatigue to decision fatigue as part of a whole. 
 This study is particularly interesting for its placement of security fatigue in the secondary 
focus to the more overarching theme of decision fatigue. By framing security fatigue as a 
situation wherein users are forced to make more decisions than they have the capacity to make, 
which is intrinsically what security fatigue boils down to when one considers the constantly 
evolving state of tech and policy, they start a discussion on not only the negative impact of 
security apparatus, but on the limitations and failings of the human mind that enable the negative 
impact of that security. 
 This research provides useful clarification about the driving forces behind security 
fatigue, which itself is truly a more domain-specific variant on decision fatigue, as noted by 
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Stanton. With this study, it becomes impossible to solely rest the blame for fatigue on the 
security mechanisms in play. The users themselves may have heuristic processes that limit their 
ability to make security decisions that would negatively impact their pursuit of a primary goal 
[10], or they may be resistant because of competence, as noted by Belanger [11], etc. This 
information is necessary for acquiring a full picture of the human element in the equation, 
potentially enriching the findings of this thesis. 
 On the more technical side of things, a conference held in 2017 featured proceedings 
from Shigeaki Tanimoto et al. for a concept modeling technique of security fatigue severity [12]. 
Following close behind the findings from 2016’s NIST study of security fatigue, they focused on 
a way to visualize the fatigue, proposing that “Over the long and mid-term, it will contribute to 
optimizing a security policy.” The study’s team produced a model of the “vicious cycle” that 
ultimately leads to security incidents, then using that in conjunction with considerations about 
burnout syndrome literature, developed a matrix model for security fatigue. 
 The developments of this study are quite interesting and potentially impactful to the field. 
Firstly, they managed to create a sensible model for the perceived severity level of fatigue with 
respect to security countermeasures, which had not been explored before. The model consisted of 
not only the perceived intensity of the fatigue, but the perceived security observance level of the 
user. The latter factor, observance, understandably has a positive or negative correlation with the 
knowledge and/or awareness of the user to security items, such as policy, practice, etc. The 
former factor, fatigue, has an impact on their willingness to adhere to security. Both axes can be 
influenced via the injection of security countermeasures, such as vacation time to reduce fatigue 
or training to increase observance level. For the purposes of visualization it is a very efficient 
scale to measure with, though it naturally has some limitations, such as the model being untested, 
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being limited to qualitative measurements, and the fact that this work was one of the first in this 
area. 
 Of course, as mentioned, the focus of the model was on qualitative ranking. No efforts 
were made by the authors to apply a quantitative measure to fatigue severity beyond the 
categorical numbering of the matrix cells. This is not an unreasonable course of action 
considering prior discussion on the matter of security fatigue severity, though it seems to be an 
intractable issue currently. Because this thesis is focused on measuring the impact of a 
generalized security fatigue rather than trying to measure its effects at different intensities, the 
model is not useful to this study. However, knowledge gleaned from their 2017 work, as well as 
their 2018 continuation, in combination with whatever findings this paper may generate, could 
provide opportunity for overlap in future research. 
 Takashi Hatashima and Shigeaki Tanimoto et al. return to continue the work performed 
in 2017 by evaluating the effectiveness of risk assessment and security fatigue visualization for 
internal e-crime [13]. Internal e-crime was chosen to be their litmus test because of its nearly 
equal impact compared to external e-crime in the most damaging cases. After examining 
criminal literature to extract 33 risk factors and risk countermeasures, they were able to 
determine that 15 of those factors could be countered through use of their security fatigue model 
to identify and mitigate risk factor causes. 
 The continuation of their prior work on the model helped to prove its usefulness in 
practical scenarios, such as policy planning, by showing the ways in which it can mitigate future 
risk. However, much like their previous work, the authors admit that it is qualitative and indirect. 
However, they have proven it can be applied to other areas, which lends credibility to the model. 
The same consideration given to their previous work applies to this one. If some useful 
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quantitative findings can be made about the impact of security fatigue, perhaps future research 
could do a more granular exploration of it, such as in the various stages of the visualization 
model.  
Methodological Literature 
 Four studies have previously been covered in relation to security fatigue [2], [6], [12], 
[13]. Of those four, only the two most recent ones have gone beyond the identification phase of 
security fatigue to try and then categorize it based on severity. The first two studies in this 
collection were concerned chiefly with defining, contextualizing, and examining security fatigue 
on its own merits [2], and contextualizing and examining security fatigue on the merit of being a 
subset of decision fatigue [6], respectively. So thus, the earlier two studies were concerned with 
developing the concept of security fatigue and the latter two were concerned with estimating its 
intensity based on categories. All these studies have been qualitative in nature. 
 The most recent two studies [12-13], both based on the visualization model of security 
fatigue, have attempted to show its danger qualitatively in order to guide behavior away from 
fatigue. Essentially, they desired to raise awareness about its presence with varied levels of 
threat. However, no attempts have been made to quantify the effects of security fatigue, let alone 
at varied levels of intensity. Lacking such information leaves too much room for interpretation 
and may lead to over or under-estimation of its impact on an organization, and that is why this 
thesis will attempt to fill the gap with a quantitative analysis of security fatigue’s effects. 
Research Design Literature 
 The primary inspiration for the data collection and processing portion of this research 
was the study conducted by Brian Stanton et al. [6]. Within their study, they analyzed data from 
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a previous study that interviewed 40 average users about their knowledge, behaviors, and 
emotions related to online activity and cybersecurity. Some categories of the questions used for 
that study were given, including questions related to online activities, computer security, security 
icons and tools, and security terminology. With questions like those, the responses acquired from 
the interviews were able to be recoded for security fatigue and produce extensive results, as 
noted when they said “When compiled together, there were more than eight single-spaced pages 
of data related to security fatigue.” The question categories provided by that study were adapted 
to become the open-response portion of the survey, which was what would provide data for the 
determination of security fatigue in a respondent.  
In order to show how respondents were thinking from a quantitative standpoint, a simple 
metric had to be chosen next, something that wouldn’t need much explanation to the average 
user and that could be evaluated objectively from the author’s side: Passwords. Literature on 
evaluating password strength checking software was used to determine validity of the primary 
tool, zxcvbn, and additional checkers were employed for redundancy and elimination of bias 
from one tool alone [14]. Zxcvbn 4.4.2 was chosen as the primary tool for analyzing passwords 
because of its open-source nature, ease of use, and documented sophistication compared to many 
other strength checkers. The decision to base strength estimates off a score given by zxcvbn, as 
opposed to a time-to-crack from a program like John the Ripper, was made primarily because of 
convenience and the apparent reliability of zxcvbn. 
Finally, literature on qualitative and mixed-methods research was used to help guide 
thinking for the execution of the study and interpretation of results, given its use of both 
qualitative and quantitative data to draw a single conclusion [3-5], [8]. 
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Conclusions 
 After review of the literature associated with security fatigue and this study, several 
things are clear about both. Firstly, with respect to security fatigue, it is not easy or advisable to 
try to quantify the severity of the fatigue [2]. Placing a measurable number to a categorical 
concept is not sensible or preferable to simply identifying it, however, it is plausible that the 
effects of the fatigue can be quantified. This is preferable, in fact, because prior research [12-13] 
has already done a well enough job defining categories wherein security fatigue may exist with 
respect to a secondary qualitative factor (security observance), and this helps organizations 
visualize its threat in order to take preventative actions against it. Those actions, however, may 
be too little or too much, running the risk of throwing fatigue-observance balance off even 
further. Though quantifying the effects of security fatigue at various stages of the fatigue-
observance matrix is beyond the scope of this thesis, an analysis of the general effect- if any- of 
the fatigue will be further useful in contextualizing its threat. Future research can expand on this 
by combining both the effects and matrix model to look for more granular differences. 
 The nature of this study is also something to consider, as it uses both qualitative and 
quantitative measurements to draw a single conclusion. Open-response questions for the survey 
were adapted from literature out of NIST [6], which based their research on data obtained from 
another 40 person study before them, which focused on security and computer knowledge and 
opinions of average users. Because this study obtained such heavily fatigue-tinged data, similar 
questions were used for the survey of this thesis, albeit modified to pertain to passwords. On the 
topic of passwords, which constitute the quantitative portion of this work, they were chosen for 
their ubiquity and objectivity for the author. Very few if any people would have trouble 
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answering non-esoteric password questions, and passwords have many means of being evaluated 
objectively, such as strength meters/checkers [14].  
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a selection of sources was examined for their place in this work. Security 
fatigue literature such as [2], [6], [12], and [13] formed the backbone of the concept being tested, 
along with applicable insights from former work by Furnell [9]. Furnell and Stanton provided 
necessary fundamental looks at security fatigue, first establishing it and then expanding it into 
the broader area of decision fatigue, which clarified that the fatigue has as much to do with 
internal human mechanisms as it does with the external security mechanisms. Tanimoto and 
Hatashima provided first the groundwork for a model of visualizing its severity, and then a 
confirmation of that model’s practicality in reducing risk. Furnell and Stanton constructed the 
frame of the problem with a stable foundation, and Tanimoto and Hatashima built out half of the 
structure by expanding upon the qualitative portion of security fatigue, which was the fatigue’s 
intensity, or how much of it is present. That left the quantitative portion of the fatigue, its 
measurable effect, that needs to be expanded upon in order to fully- or mostly, pending future 
work- define its threat. 
For this study, Stanton provided inspiration for the questions that would help determine 
security fatigue, based upon an older study of average users and their views on security and 
technology topics. Passwords were chosen independently, however, for they are ubiquitous and 
easy to interpret, both for the respondent and the author. Appropriate tools were chosen to guide 
the quantitative portion of the thesis, both during survey development, data collection, and 
analysis [14]. It was also determined that the nature of this research as mixed-methods will 
benefit its goal by providing both context (fatigued vs non-fatigued) and proof (quantitative 
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scoring) in the same instance. Where needed, efforts were taken to limit the disadvantages of 
such research- generalizability concerns, consistency issues, etc.- by using techniques and 
insights from past works [3-5], [8]. 
In the next chapter, the Methodology of this study will be reviewed.  
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III – Research Methodology 
 The methodology set forth in this chapter and its constituent parts are all used in the 
pursuit of quantifying security fatigue’s effects. The following chapter will extensively cover the 
methodology of this study, which has been broken up over the following sections: (1) Research 
Method, (2) Research Questions/Hypotheses, (3) Population and Sample, (4) Informed Consent 
and Confidentiality, (5) Instrumentation, (7) Data Analysis, and (8) Summary. 
Research Method and Design Appropriateness 
 As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis takes a mixed-method approach to the problems and 
hypotheses being discussed and tested. In contrast to single-method approaches that focus on 
purely qualitative or quantitative processes, mixed-method studies attempt to use the advantages 
of both approaches to enhance each other, while also assuming some of the risk associated with 
both designs. Quantitative studies have great potential in supporting change to existing theory or 
proving points, owing to their use of statistically provable results. Consequently, quantitative 
studies may miss important context behind data because they are chiefly concerned only with the 
numerical results. Qualitative studies are, naturally, the opposite. They offer more open-ended 
approaches to problem solving and analysis than a rigid mathematical one would, which allows 
them to produce more contextually relevant results. Said results can offer insight into conceptual 
topics and phenomena that science cannot yet fully explain with math, but of course, that means 
results from a qualitative study will likely be subjective to some degree, making their acceptance 
in less agreeable circles more difficult. 
  Given the topic of security fatigue, one would immediately associate it with a quality of 
a person, how fatigued they are about security. Like any other kind of fatigue, it will vary per 
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person and from situation to situation, so getting a measure on the intensity of its presence is not 
so easy. It is an issue that can only be directly observed qualitatively, such as by grouping people 
into categories of their perceived level of fatigue. Even still, however, stating that one person is 
“at risk” while another is “deeply fatigued” does not tell much about it. Even by associating 
predicted behavior patterns with those categories, such as putting off password resets until the 
day of expiration, the actual risk associated with each category is open to interpretation. Some 
may see it as normal behavior that everyone engages in, while others may think it is a critical 
weakness in the organization. This subjectivity inhibits a sense of urgency to rise around the 
fatigue. 
 However, though the severity of the fatigue may only realistically be qualified, the effects 
it leads to could be quantified. For instance- and this is the stratagem of the mixed-method 
approach here, the measure of how fatigued and non-fatigued people score passwords could be 
analyzed for a correlation. Firstly though, you would have to show that some of the people 
scoring were fatigued, and that is where the qualitative portion comes into play. Then it becomes 
possible to not only determine that fatigue is present, but to also give it more urgency with 
quantifiable values.  
 For the goals of this thesis, which are answering the questions and testing the hypotheses 
in the following section, this mixed-method approach is best. A qualitative analysis alone could 
not solve the issue of urgency, and a quantitative analysis will not work on its own. For context, 
the fatigue state is necessary with this topic. 
Research Questions/Hypotheses 
This section reiterates the previously stated research questions and hypotheses of Chapter 1. 
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R1: Is security fatigue present in the sample? 
R1.1: What is the proportion of fatigued respondents to non-fatigued respondents? 
R1.2: Does the presence of security fatigue have a consistent, observable effect on the perceived 
strength of passwords? 
H1: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will be dominantly represented in the sample, such 
that the proportion of fatigued vs. non-fatigued respondents will be larger by some arbitrary 
amount. 
H2: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will have a negative impact on the perceived strength 
of passwords, i.e., those displaying signs of security fatigue will show a higher trust in weaker 
passwords overall than those who do not show fatigue. 
Population and Sample 
The population for this study is the whole of the student body at the University of 
Tennessee at Chattanooga. This is including Undergraduates and Graduates, as well as every 
major department that could be included given the responses. The desired sample size is 377, 
which is the minimum number of responses needed to confidently make assertions about the 
whole population. Additionally, the sample would ideally be evenly representative of major 
departments so that there is not overrepresentation of certain groups. With a combined 
Undergraduate and Graduate population of 11651 according to 2019 data [15], the sample size 
for a statistically significant result at 95% confidence is 377, but the real size of the collected 
sample after excluding nonviable responses was 135. This gives a margin of error of 
approximately 8% versus the desired 5%. 
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Informed Consent and Confidentiality 
Consent of respondents was acquired via their agreement to a consent form on the survey 
before any questions were presented to them. If they declined to consent to the collection of their 
responses and any other data associated with the survey, then they were disallowed from 
participating in the study. For those who did consent to participate, a minimal amount of 
questions that could elicit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) were presented, and the 
settings of the survey were set to not automatically record any respondent information such as IP 
address, name, etc. Emphasis was made for respondents to not include their names, and all 
questions in the survey were carefully designed to reduce the chance of an accidental PII 
inclusion. After all responses were recorded, the dataset was downloaded and cleaned of any PII 
as it was analyzed. The dataset was stored on the author’s password-protected computer running 
Windows Defender and Malwarebytes scans on a regular basis. No cloud storage was used, nor 
were any cloud-based applications used in the analysis of the dataset. After conclusion of 
analysis and final results, the dataset will be erased both off the author’s device and 
SurveyMonkey, the platform that hosted the survey. 
See Appendix A for the informed consent form.  
Instrumentation 
Instrumentation for this thesis includes a survey collecting both open-response and 
Likert-scale answers from respondents. The survey was administered as a single whole, but for 
the purposes of discussion about it and its results, the survey is described as having two sections- 
the aforementioned two kinds of questions. Section 1, which contains the open-ended questions, 
was intended to elicit information used in the deduction of fatigue. Questions in Section 1 were 
inspired by the categories of questions presented in [2]. Section 2, which contains the Likert-
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scale questions, was intended to measure the user’s perceived strength of some given passwords. 
The table below shows where the sections of the survey work to answer the research questions 
and/or hypotheses. 
RQ/H Section 1 Questions Section 2 Questions 
R1 X  
R1.1 X  
R1.2 X X 
H1 X  
H2 X X 
Table 1: Alignment of Survey Sections to Research Questions/Hypotheses 
See Appendix B for the questions of the survey. 
Data Analysis 
The analysis for this thesis was performed over three sets of data formed by splitting the 
collected information from the survey: Fatigue-related (qualitative) data, password-related 
(quantitative) data, and combined (both) data. 
Qualitative Analysis 
The fatigue-related data originated from Section 1 of the survey and elicited responses 
that could be analyzed for signs of security fatigue. Several categories were made for grouping 
responses, as well as a tags system for extracting additional information from responses that 
could be used to look for possible trends. 
Categories and Criteria 
Three overall categories were provided for the responses: Potentially Fatigued, 
Potentially Non-fatigued, and Inconclusive.  
The former two are preceded by “Potentially” because of the difficult task of empirically 
proving fatigue. It may, in fact, be impossible to empirically prove fatigue given the kind of data 
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collected here, and so the categories are taken as estimates of a respondent’s state. The choice 
between “Potentially Fatigued” vs. “Potentially Non-fatigued” falls to a consideration of the 
interpreted tone of the response, words used in the response, and nature of the question asked. 
For instance: The nature of the question may elicit an opinion about mandatory password 
changes, and the respondent may use definably negative language such as “hate it” or “it is a 
hassle,” which may then be a potential case for labeling that question’s response as “Potentially 
Fatigued.”  
The overall tone of the response may differ from small segments, however, such as if the 
respondent states “it is a hassle, but I understand and follow the rules,” which may then be a case 
for labeling the question response as “Potentially Non-fatigued” since they indicated they still 
adhere to best practices. It could be stated that the individual still shows some signs of fatigue 
and may be heading toward a state of it that affects their actions as well as their beliefs, but 
grouping based upon severity is beyond the scope of this thesis and has already been done before 
[12-13]. Tags help make up for this shortcoming. 
 The Inconclusive category exists for catching non-relevant responses that may be off-
topic or uselessly vague (single word answers), as well as instances where the count of 
Potentially Fatigued and Potentially Non-Fatigued answers were equal, which is taken as 
meaning the respondent could lean either way. 
 All coding for the fatigue-related questions was performed by hand. Continued quality 
and objectivity of coding over the dataset was ensured through reiteration of previously coded 
responses, but the limitations of a single coder must be considered when interpreting the final 
results. A team of several experts to assist in coding would have been ideal for providing group 
confirmation of findings, but this was an unavoidable limitation of the work. Additionally, the 
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analysis for this section’s data was performed over the course of several weeks, often in batches 
of 10-20 responses at a time, which could have potentially led to minor alterations in coding 
performance due to changes in the author’s mood and other factors. 
Tags 
Tags are a response to the limited number of categories used for coding. When analyzing 
the answers, certain keywords or phrases become shared between different respondents. Themes 
like “hard time remembering” and “hate” can be indicators for the tags “Difficulty 
Remembering” and “Frustration” respectively, which themselves have definitions that extend the 
value of the responses beyond the categories. Using tags, the categories are kept simple and 
uncluttered, and data can be examined for tags to check for trends. For instance, if by the end 
there was a dominant percentage of responses that had the “Difficulty Remembering” tag, then 
that may be an indicator of a predominant source of fatigue. Though that example is unhelpful 
for showing correlation between security fatigue and perceived password strength, it could allow 
for extension of the discussion into other areas at the end, such as what issues were faced most 
by the fatigued group vs. the non-fatigued group. 
Tags were assigned while the questions were being coded. Performing these two duties 
concurrently not only saved time, but it also improved both processes. By paying close attention 
to the words and phrases being used in the responses, more tags could occasionally be derived 
from the text, which helped to make coding more systematic with the addition of new 
documented patterns to watch for. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Responses from Section 2 of the survey contained scorings of ten passwords provided to 
the respondents. Scores given by each respondent could range between 1 and 5 using the zxcvbn 
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rating scale [14]. With ten questions, this gives each question a maximum .10 value (if rated as 
5/5, or Very Strong) and a minimum 0 value (if rated 0/5, or Very Weak). The Section 2 total for 
each respondent was summed and then compared against the sum of the machine-calculated 
strength values using zxcvbn, which was .44. Any score above this threshold would indicate a 
higher trust in the strength of the passwords than is actual, and any score below it would indicate 
a lack of trust. 
To give a short example, the sum score of a respondent may be .54. This value is the sum 
of the ten password scores given by the respondent, as each password may be scored anywhere 
between 0/5 to 5/5, or 0 to .10, considering that there are ten passwords in total. Compared 
against the true sum score of the passwords according to zxcvbn, which is .44, the respondent 
shows higher trust in the strength of the passwords than is actually true. 
Combined Analysis 
After both sections were analyzed, the respondent’s Section 1 determination could then 
be compared with their Section 2 result to achieve any one of the following states: 
1. Fatigued with high trust 
2. Fatigued with low trust 
3. Non-Fatigued with high trust 
4. Non-Fatigued with low trust 
5. Inconclusive (considering Section 1 only)  
Summary 
In this chapter, it was further discussed that the chosen research design of unifying 
qualitative and quantitative data was appropriate. This is because singularly qualitative or 
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quantitative designs would not elicit a great enough amount of urgency or context, respectively, 
to provide useful insights about security fatigue and its effects. To generate more practically 
applicable findings, it is thus necessary to approach this topic as a mixed-methods one. 
This design is epitomized by the primary data collection tool, a survey, which was 
composed of two sections. Section 1 was concerned with gathering open-ended answers to 
questions that had, in previous studies [2], been found to elicit responses showing security 
fatigue. Section 2 was composed of ten passwords that had been chosen at random and scored 
with zxcvbn prior to survey distribution. Respondents would rate the passwords’ strength on a 
Likert scale going from 1 to 5, or in other words, Very Weak to Very Strong, which was the 
same scale used by zxcvbn. The survey was distributed to the UTC campus student population, 
which according to an official 2019 report totaled 11651 students, a combined total of 
Undergraduates and Graduates [15]. An attempt was made to distribute as widely as possible to 
reach every department the author could, with the ultimate goal of obtaining 377 responses, 
which would equate to a statistically significant sample (5% error, 95% confidence) for the 
aforementioned population size. However, only 135 responses were received, putting the margin 
of error at around 8% instead of 5%. 
Once the survey closed and the responses were collected, the analysis process followed as 
such: Three categories- Potentially Fatigued, Potentially Non-Fatigued, and Inconclusive- were 
created for grouping responses during coding of Section 1, and a tag system was developed to 
help offset the limited number of categories by providing additional depth and analytical 
potential to each response. For Section 2, the sum score given for the passwords in that section 
would be calculated as a fractional part from 0 to 1. The sum of each respondent’s ten password 
scores would then be compared against the true zxcvbn calculated sum for the ten passwords. 
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With both sections finished, they could be compared to begin drawing conclusions. Individually, 
each response could be analyzed to fall into one of five categories corresponding to one of the 
five combinations possible with the data, those being: Fatigued with high trust, Fatigued with 
low trust, Non-Fatigued with high trust, Non-Fatigued with low trust, and Inconclusive 
(considering Section 1 only). Collectively, the dataset’s results could be analyzed to answer the 
research questions and hypotheses. 
 In the next chapter, the results of the data analysis will be reviewed. 
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IV – Results 
This chapter shall review the results of the thesis. As a reminder, this thesis is being 
conducted for the purpose of finding any correlation between the presence of security fatigue in a 
person and their perceptions of password strength. This chapter will be laid out as follows: (1) 
Research Questions/Hypotheses, (2) Results, and (3) Summary. 
Research Questions/Hypotheses 
Below are the research questions and hypotheses to be discussed in this section. 
Additionally, a breakdown of the hypotheses into their Null/Alternate form is provided. 
R1: Is security fatigue present in the sample? 
R1.1: What is the proportion of fatigued respondents to non-fatigued respondents? 
R1.2: Does the presence of security fatigue have a consistent, observable effect on the perceived 
strength of passwords? 
H1: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will be dominantly represented in the sample, such 
that the proportion of fatigued vs. non-fatigued respondents will be larger by some arbitrary 
amount. 
H0: ∑PF <= ∑PNF 
H1: ∑PF > ∑PNF 
H2: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will have a negative impact on the perceived strength 
of passwords, i.e., those displaying signs of security fatigue will show a higher trust in weaker 
passwords overall than those who do not show fatigue. 
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H0: x̄FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH <= x̄NON-FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH 
H1: x̄FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH > x̄NON-FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH 
Results 
The results in this section are separated out into two sub-sections: Fatigue results & Tags, 
and password strength results. The research questions and hypotheses of this thesis will be 
covered in the sections that most pertain to them. 
In total, 135 viable responses were acquired during the data collection period of this 
study. 
Fatigue Results 
The distribution of potentially fatigued (PF) vs. potentially non-fatigued (PNF) responses 
in the collected dataset were heavily skewed in favor of the potentially non-fatigued group. The 
proportion of PNF to PF responses was roughly 2:1 (63.70% vs. 28.89% or 86 vs 39). The INC 
responses accounted for about a small 7.41% (10) of responses. Of the PF responses, none were purely 
fatigued across all five questions used to elicit the fatigue state. Of the PNF responses, 24 were purely 
non-fatigued, meaning all five of their answers showed no signs of fatigue. Of the INC responses, only 1 
was deemed inconclusive because each answer was inconclusive. All other 9 INC responses were 
balanced out in their PF and PNF answers, meaning they each had 1 answer marked as INC. 
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Fig 1: Fatigue Distribution 
 These results imply that contrary to the author’s initial assumption about the prevalence 
of fatigue among these respondents, most of them are not dominantly showing signs of fatigue. 
This supports the null hypothesis of H1, and it also supplies answers to R1 and R1.1. This 
finding is, of course, based on the assumption that having a majority of PNF answers to the five 
questions over a minority of PF answers makes the respondent PNF overall. However, if a laxer 
interpretation of the results is taken, such that any sign of fatigue marks the respondent as 
fatigued, the results change dramatically. 
 Based on the observation that only 24 of the PNF responses were purely non-fatigued, 
and using the interpretation mentioned above, the number of PF responses would jump to 110, 
including the 9 INC responses that balanced out. That would raise the proportion of PF vs PNF 
responses to about 81.48% vs 17.80% or 110 vs 24. This tremendous change would then support 
the alternative hypothesis of H1. Prior research, as was covered in previous chapters, could 
support this laxer interpretation. It is to the belief of the author, however, that if given the benefit 
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either necessity or reluctant acceptance. For this thesis, the benefit of the doubt is given, but 
others should consider their own thoughts on the matter when interpreting the leaning of the 
results. 
H1 R1 R1.1 
Null hypothesis accepted. 
Majority of dataset is not 
fatigued. 
Dataset contains fatigue. Accepted Interpretation 
~63.70% PNF vs. 28.89% PF 
or 86 vs 39 
Alt. Interpretation 
~81.48% PF vs 17.80% PNF 
or 110 vs 24 
Table 2: H1, R1, & R1.1 Findings 
Tags 
Tags are descriptors added to each response to provide extra insight that may otherwise 
be lost with a simple category assignment. For the purposes of proving the research questions or 
hypotheses of this thesis, tags are not relevant, but the author wished to include this tagging 
system in order to document common themes in the answers. The results of the tags analysis will 
only be covered for the PF and PNF groups. 
 Overall, 11 tags were developed in accordance with themes in the dataset. Only 10 will 
be listed, as one tag only appeared once throughout the entire dataset. Additionally, only the 
analysis of the top three will be covered. The tags, their descriptions, their frequencies, and their 
approximate percentage of responses that they appear in, proceed as follows: 
Tag Description Frequency Approx. Perc. Freq. 
Frustration Respondent indicates 
anger/frustration. 
72 53% 
Forced Adherence Respondent indicates 
that they are forced to 
adhere to certain 
rules, guidelines, or 
practices. 
55 41% 








passwords, rules, etc. 
49 36% 
Lax Respondent indicates 
that they can be lax in 
regard to something, 
such as password 
security or guidelines 
adherence. 
Differentiated from 
Frustration by a lack 
of animosity. 
31 23% 
Too Much Respondent indicates 
that there is an aspect 
of something which 
overwhelms them. 
24 18% 




Not Target Respondent does not 
believe they are a 
target for cyber 
threats 
11 8% 
Pointless Respondent feels that 
something security-
related is pointless or 
of little importance 
9 7% 
Need More Security Respondent thinks 
that a security aspect 
is lacking in some 
way and should be 
improved. 
8 6% 
Victim Respondent has been 
a victim of a 
cybercrime before. 
7 5% 
Table 3: Tags List 
 Of the top three tags, it can be seen that frustration is dominant. This was typically 
expressed in negative words synonymous with anger- or with the actual words “frustrated” or 
“frustration.” It was also usually expressed with regards to questions 2 or 3, which elicited 
feelings about password complexity requirements and mandatory password resets, respectively. 
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 Forced adherence was typically indicated in response to question 5, which asked whether 
the respondent always adhered to password complexity guidelines. The question may have been 
misunderstood as mandatory requirements set by organizations instead of recommended 
guidelines, such as those published by NIST or other standards bodies. 
 Difficulty remembering was often associated with questions 2 or 4, which dealt with 
feelings about password complexity requirements and whether password strength/complexity 
was a concern for the respondent, respectively. 
Breaking down the top three tags based on their distribution within both the PF and PNF 
groups, these are the results: 
Tag Potentially Fatigued Potentially Non-Fatigued 
Frustration 24 (~61.5% of responses) 44 (~51.2% of responses) 
Forced Adherence 15 (~38.5% of responses) 36 (~41.9% of responses) 
Difficulty Remembering 23 (~59% of responses) 23 (~26.7% of responses) 
Table 4: Top 3 Tags Breakdown 
Note that all percentages are based off the accepted interpretation of the fatigue results. 
 As can be seen for the PF group, the Frustration and Difficulty Remembering tags were 
very close in frequency. However, cases where they both appeared in a response in the PF group 
were rarer (11, or ~28.2% of PF responses), indicating they may not be connected factors. 
Forced Adherence showed up the least of the top three tags in the PF group. 
 By contrast, Difficulty Remembering was the lowest of the top three tags in the PNF 
group. This makes sense considering that fatigued individuals have some tolerance for password 
management, or at the least employ strategies to reduce the workload of it, such as using 
password managers. Forced Adherence was marginally greater in its overall distribution 
compared to the PF group, but the two were close, which again may be related to wording of 
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question 5 in the fatigue section of the survey. The most common tag of the top three in the PNF 
group was, again, Frustration. Compared to the overall distribution of the PF group, it was over 
10% less, but it still tinged over 50% of the PNF responses. 
Password Strength Results 
For judging the password strength results, a baseline score of the ten provided passwords 
was determined to be 22/50, or .44. The distribution for this section for Potentially Fatigued, 
Potentially Non-Fatigued, and Inconclusive groups is shown in the chart below. 
 
Fig 2: Password Scoring Distribution 
 As is clear from the chart, most responses fell above the true score threshold of .44. The 
mean, standard deviation, median, mode, and variance rounded to three decimal places of all 
groups, all groups sans INC, the PF group, the PNF group, and the INC group are listed below. 
Group Mean Stan. Dev. Median Mode Variance 
All groups  .655 .104 .660 .660 .011 
All groups 
(no INC) 
.652 .107 .660 .640 .011 
PF .654 .111 .640 .620 .012 
41 | P a g e  
 
PNF .651 .106 .660 .760 .011 
INC .698 .048 .690 .660 .002 
Table 5: Password Scoring Group Results 
 The numbers for the INC group are, of course, vastly different from the other groups, 
owing to the small number of responses deemed INC (only 10). For that reason, and because this 
thesis is primarily concerned with the PF and PNF groups, only the results of the combined 
scores without INC will be covered in future discussion. The differences between the combined 
scores with and without INC are fairly small, but for stats like the mean it is an important 
distinction. The conclusions of this thesis are not predicted to change regardless of whether the 
outlier INC group is excluded from final consideration or not. 
 The main takeaway from this data is that is that the mean of the combined groups (.652) 
is significantly higher than the true mean of the given passwords (.44). This implies that 
respondents (students) generally scored the strength of passwords higher than they really were. 
This is also true for each subgroup (PF, PNF, INC), showing that the overestimation of strength 
is not tied to fatigue state. 
 This is further reinforced by t-tests with equal variances of the PF and PNF groups. 
Compared against an alpha of .05, the one-tailed test reports a P score of about .429, and the two-
tailed test reports a P score of about .857. There is no statistical difference between the two 
means, and thus, H2 must accept the null hypothesis as well, that potentially fatigued 
respondents do not show insecure perceptions of password strength to a greater degree than non-
fatigued respondents do, at least by any significant margin. Additionally, this answers R1.2, that 
there is no consistent observable effect of security fatigue on perceived password strength. 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
H2 R1.2 
Null hypothesis accepted 
 
No statistical difference between means of 
Potentially Fatigued and Potentially Non-
Fatigued groups. 
There is no consistent observable effect on 
perceived password strength as a result of 
security fatigue. 
Table 6: H2 & R1.2 Findings 
Summary 
In this chapter, the results on analysis of 135 responses was discussed. Two hypotheses 
and three research questions were tested and answered, respectively. 
During discussion of the fatigue data results, it was reported that the proportion of PNF to 
PF responses was roughly 2:1 (63.70% vs. 28.89% or 86 vs 39). This made it so that the null 
hypothesis of H1 was accepted, and it also answered research questions R1 and R1.1. Musings on the 
number of purely non-fatigued vs. purely fatigued responses brought up an interesting conflict of 
interpretations, however. By adopting a laxer stance that says any fatigue in a set of five questions causes 
the whole response to be fatigued, the proportion of PF to PNF responses changes to about 81.48% vs 
17.80% or 110 vs 24, including the 9 non-pure INC responses as part of PF. This change would 
have a dramatic impact on the conclusions of the thesis, but it was decided to continue using the 
strict interpretation of the results, where a majority PF or PNF answers in the set of five 
questions made the response PF or PNF respectively. This was decided based on the grounds that 
most people may harbor fatigue to a degree, but they still engage in good practices out of either 
necessity or reluctant acceptance, thus their practice has not necessarily suffered from their 
beliefs yet. 
The tags system, a support for the fatigue questions, was also reviewed. The top three 
tags based on frequency were: Frustration (FR), Forced Adherence (FA), and Difficulty 
Remembering (DR), in that order. FR was described as “Respondent indicates anger/frustration,” 
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which was dominantly linked to survey questions 2 and 3. FA was described as “Respondent 
indicates that they are forced to adhere to certain rules, guidelines, or practices,” which was 
dominantly linked to survey question 5. Finally, DR was described as “Respondent indicates 
difficulty in remembering certain things, like passwords, rules, etc,” which was dominantly 
linked to survey questions 2 and 4. 
These three tags were then broken down by their presence in the PF and PNF groups 
specifically. FR and DR were more common in the PF group than the PNF group, but FA was 
almost proportionally equal between them. Notably, DR was significantly less present in the 
PNF group than the PF group, potentially owing to higher tolerance for password management or 
the use of software to reduce the workload of it. 
Finally, in conjunction with the fatigue results, the password strength results were 
reviewed. The true mean score of the ten provided passwords on the survey was .44, and the 
mean score of PF+PNF groups was .652. This implied that respondents (students) generally 
scored the strength of passwords higher than they really were. This was also true for all 
subgroups, including INC, when analyzed on their own, with each reporting above .651, up to 
.698 with the outlying INC group. This showed that perceived password strength was not tied to 
the fatigue state. This result is then further supported by t-tests with equal variance between the 
PF and PNF groups. Compared against an alpha of .05, the one-tailed test reported a P score of 
about .429, and the two-tailed test reported a P score of about .857. 
With no statistical difference between the means of the two groups, the null hypothesis of 
H2 was accepted, that potentially fatigued respondents did not show insecure perceptions of 
password strength to a higher degree than their non-fatigued counterparts. R1.2 was also 
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answered by this result. Below is a table of research questions and hypotheses and their 
corresponding results. 
RQ/H Result 
R1 Dataset contains fatigue. 
R1.1 Accepted Interpretation 
~63.70% PNF vs. 28.89% PF or 86 vs 39 
Alt. Interpretation 
~81.48% PF vs 17.80% PNF or 110 vs 24 
R1.2 There is no consistent observable effect on 
perceived password strength as a result of 
security fatigue. 
H1 Null hypothesis accepted. 
Majority of dataset is not fatigued. 
H2 Null hypothesis accepted 
 
No statistical difference between means of 
Potentially Fatigued and Potentially Non-
Fatigued groups. 
Table 7: Research Questions & Hypotheses Combined Findings 
In the next chapter, the conclusions to this paper and its associated topics will be covered. 
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V – Conclusions 
This chapter shall conclude the findings of this thesis, discuss some shortcomings and 
limitations of the work presented herein, and provide recommendations for further work on this 
subject. The outline is as follows: (1) Research Questions/Hypotheses, (2) Discussion of 
Findings, (3) Limitations, (4) Recommendations to Leader and Practitioners, (5) 
Recommendations for Future Research, and the (6) Summary. 
Research Questions/Hypotheses 
Below are the research questions and hypotheses to be discussed in this section. 
Additionally, a breakdown of the hypotheses into their Null/Alternate form is provided. 
R1: Is security fatigue present in the sample? 
R1.1: What is the proportion of fatigued respondents to non-fatigued respondents? 
R1.2: Does the presence of security fatigue have a consistent, observable effect on the perceived 
strength of passwords? 
H1: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will be dominantly represented in the sample, such 
that the proportion of fatigued vs. non-fatigued respondents will be larger by some arbitrary 
amount. 
H0: ∑PF <= ∑PNF 
H1: ∑PF > ∑PNF 
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H2: It is hypothesized that security fatigue will have a negative impact on the perceived strength 
of passwords, i.e., those displaying signs of security fatigue will show a higher trust in weaker 
passwords overall than those who do not show fatigue. 
H0: x̄FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH <= x̄NON-FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH 
H1: x̄FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH > x̄NON-FATIGUED PASSWORD STRENGTH 
Discussion of Findings 
The final results for the two hypotheses of this thesis will be discussed in this section. 
Discussion will primarily take place through answering the research questions which tie into the 
hypotheses and then addressing the relevant hypothesis itself. Exact measurements will not be 
given as such would be redundant with the previous chapter, but the conclusions of the findings 
will be reiterated. 
Hypothesis 1 
For R1, it was evident in the results that the collected dataset did contain responses 
showing security fatigue. Such was clear from the markedly negative language directed toward 
security topics or objects, such as the expression of frustration toward password reset practices. 
For R1.1, the results were a bit more unexpected. The ratio of fatigued to non-fatigued 
responses was notably skewed in favor of non-fatigued, which was not the assumed reality of the 
group being sampled from. The assumption of greater fatigue in the sample was made primarily 
from the author’s own experiences with these topics and conversations with other students in the 
past. 
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This, of course, meant that H1 could not find support for the alternative hypothesis. This 
could, however, be different if a less strict categorization technique was employed. As was 
covered in Chapter 4, out of the five questions used to determine the fatigue state of the 
respondent, the majority category represented in those five questions became the overall 
category. This meant responses with 2 non-fatigued and 3 fatigued answers were categorized as 
fatigued, but responses with 3 non-fatigued and 2 fatigued answers were deemed non-fatigued. 
With a less stringent approach that equates any fatigued answer to the overall state of being 
fatigued, H1 would accept the alternative hypothesis by a large margin. Interpretation, as with 
most qualitative analyses, is partially up to the interpreter. 
Hypothesis 2 
For the last research question, R3, the presence of security fatigue did not seem to have 
any effect on the perceived strength of passwords among students. Rather, there was an almost 
similar mean perceived strength between the fatigued and non-fatigued groups. That mean was 
also well above the true mean strength score of the passwords given for scoring. A possible 
cause for this similarity between groups may, at first, be attributed to the presence of some 
fatigue in a large portion of the non-fatigued responses, but as will be covered soon, the mean of 
the purely non-fatigued group does not actually differ much from the mean of the loosely 
interpreted fatigue group (the vast majority). Thus, it can be assumed that there is something else 
causing the results to clump together. Password managers could be one cause, as they reduce the 
burden of remembering passwords and often offer to generate new ones, so a user of such a tool 
may not have a realistic outlook on password strength after becoming comfortable with a 
manager doing all the heavy lifting. Both fatigued and non-fatigued individuals have reasons to 
use such tools as well, with the former choosing it because it reduces the memory burden or 
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provides convenience, and the latter choosing it because it possesses security functions that they 
deem valuable. 
While the results of analysis could not show any effect of security fatigue, it did show 
consistently inaccurate perceptions of password strength among the sampled students. 
Explanations for this could range anywhere from lack of education on the topic of password 
security to apathy or cultural influences, but it is unlikely that any of the respondents scored 
them while being unfamiliar with passwords, as that is an extremely unlikely scenario for this 
sample. 
The implications for H2 are, like H1, that there was no evidence to support the alternative 
hypothesis. This would not change even in the event of the looser interpretation of categorization 
being used, as the mean score for the purely non-fatigued group (.631) is only slightly lower than 
the score for the loosely interpreted fatigued group (.657). 
What Could Be Improved 
Some things about this thesis, specifically the data collection portion of it, could have 
used some extra attention.  
Firstly, the survey needed more work, such as a pilot study, to be air-tight in the quality 
of its questions. Some of them, namely questions 1 and 5, elicited responses that were of dubious 
usefulness. Question 1 overall elicited many identical responses from students across the board, 
barring a few outliers. The responses given read very much like the usual guidelines one would 
hear or read for passwords, such as using an assortment of different keyboard characters, making 
the password long, and making it something only the creator would know. While such responses 
are not necessarily useless, in that they establish that the majority of respondents know what 
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precautions to take for password creation, they nonetheless bias the dataset toward the non-
fatigued camp. 
Question 5 was poorly worded, asking respondents if they always “adhere to password 
complexity guidelines?” This was poorly worded because the distinction between “guidelines” 
and “requirements” may not always be clear, and many respondents seemed to show this. The 
Forced Adherence tag was greatly prevalent throughout the dataset as a result of respondents 
interpreting “guidelines,” which can be pieces of advice or rules of thumb that are not necessarily 
mandatory, as “requirements,” which would be the mandatory criteria enforced during something 
such as password creation. As a result of this confusion, question 5’s usefulness in determining 
security fatigue was reduced, as the true meaning behind each student’s answer was often 
obscured behind the issue of Forced Adherence.  
Recommendations to Leaders and Practitioners 
If the results of this study are to be taken for practical application, it should be done so 
under the following context and in the following way, or similar ones as determined by the user. 
These results are primarily going to be applicable to public universities, especially those 
in the Southeast United States, that have a wide range of degree programs across many 
disciplines. These results are also most useful to said universities that do not have, or have not 
widely adopted, a 2-Factor Authentication (2FA) system to supplement the use of passwords. 
2FA will reduce the risk posed by passwords, thus reducing the risk posed by those with insecure 
password perceptions which may bleed into their practices. 
Security fatigue, whether interpreted strictly on a majority x out of y scale or loosely on a 
x in y scale, is almost certainly present in any given student population. Pressures from 
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coursework, technology knowledge gaps, and students’ personal lives may not permit them the 
constant vigilance or patience needed to put up with increasing security requirements and the 
like. However, the effect this has on their idea of what constitutes a strong password seems 
negligible. According to the data, most of the students, fatigued or not, are going to think about 
password strength in similar ways to each other. That is to say, they will generally view a weak 
password as stronger than it is, and thus they may also create such insecure passwords. This is a 
threat to both the student and university, as a compromised student account could lead to further 
complications elsewhere on the network. 
Other research surrounding security fatigue proposes means to reduce the fatigue in a 
person, but how useful this would be for changing their perception of password strength is 
unclear, as the data suggests it remains, on average, quite steady regardless of fatigue state. 
Considering that, the focus should not be on trying to reduce security fatigue as much as it 
should be providing password education, or even better, authentication alternatives. 2FA is a 
powerful tool to augment the meek password, and if such a system has not yet been implemented 
at the university, or simply hasn’t been advertised, then more effort and funding should go 
toward doing so. The various costs both in time and money to setup such a system may be 
scrutinized, but the overhead from its installation will be paid back in the form of hardened 
security and, if implemented in a user-friendly manner, greater client satisfaction from both 
camps, fatigued and non-fatigued. 2FA would bring enhanced peace of mind without adding as 
significant a user obligation as increasing the length of their password, which would appeal to 
those seeking easy solutions as much as it would to those who value their security at any cost. 
Furthermore, while password strength perceptions in this sample overall were less secure than 
ideal, they were not excessively so, indicating at the very least that these students make an effort 
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to recognize bad passwords. Such individuals may be more receptive to alternative 
authentication schemes, given that it would reduce the effort they need in order to be compliant 
and secure. 
In the interim period between having 2FA and not having it, educational resources about 
password security should be made readily available and distributed to students in an easily 
digestible format. Additionally, password managers and other helpful tools to reduce the self-
security workload should be pushed as well. 
All the advice given here has been centered around students, but of course, any sweeping 
change like implementing 2FA or more actively spreading educational resources are going to 
benefit all other groups as well, such as faculty. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 It is worth considering that the study which inspired this one was using data from in-
person interviews, where the richness of human interaction can reveal far more detail and nuance 
than a mere survey can. Given time and resource constraints, this thesis had to make a sacrifice 
in that regard to acquire enough data for a thorough analysis. However, if a researcher or team 
were to recreate this study using interviews and improve upon the noted shortcomings of it, then 
even more insightful discoveries could be made. 
 Additionally, there are some avenues that exist that may branch off from this work and 
the works of others referenced within it. Most importantly, confirmation of the findings of this 
research would be of great interest, whether that is done through the aforementioned interviews 
or some other means. Others may also seek to find if varying stages of security fatigue, such as 
those used in the model made by Tanimoto and Hatashima [12-13], show different password 
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scoring results. The findings of such a study could reveal more about the influence of security 
fatigue beyond what this one or any other study has done before. 
Summary 
In this chapter, and this work as a whole, three research questions and two hypotheses 
were answered and tested respectively, producing conclusions that ran contrary to what the 
author initially believed would be the case. 
 Hypothesis 1, which posited that the proportion of fatigued to non-fatigued respondents 
in the sample would be greater, was not supported by the facts. The null hypothesis was 
accepted, given that the non-fatigued group was significantly larger than the fatigued group. This 
conclusion was influenced primarily by two factors in the data collection and analysis of the 
work: Issues with a few survey questions and a rigid stance on results interpretation. In the 
former, two questions of the survey suffered from distinct problems, with one biasing the dataset 
and the other being misinterpreted due to wording. In the latter, a rigid interpretation of the 
results was used when categorizing responses, which ended up creating a situation wherein the 
results could swing between very non-fatigued or very fatigued depending on one’s choice of 
interpretation. In the end, the rigid variant was kept, as the author felt it was appropriate to give 
respondents the benefit of the doubt about their fatigue state. Research questions 1 and 1.1 were 
answered alongside hypothesis 1, as there was fatigue present in the sample and the proportion of 
the groups was analyzed. 
Hypothesis 2, which guessed that the sample would show security fatigue having a 
negative impact on perceived password strength, was also unable to support itself. The null 
hypothesis, that there was no negative effect, was taken instead. However, this is not to say that 
the sample was primarily leaning toward secure scoring of passwords, far from it in fact. Both 
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groups, fatigued and non-fatigued, showed very similar mean scores, both of which were well 
above the true strength score of the given passwords. Even in the case where the loose 
interpretation of results was taken, the differences between the two groups were still negligible. 
This conclusion also satisfied research question 1.2, which desired to see whether a consistent 
and observable effect on perceived password strength was caused by security fatigue, which it 
was not, as no meaningful difference could be found between the groups. 
With these answers in mind, the problem of how to deal with security fatigue’s effect on 
perceived password strength among students became clear: Do not focus on the fatigue. As far as 
the data suggests, there is no real difference in the average fatigued student’s mind vs a non-
fatigued one when they are asked to rate the strength of a password. Thus, when they are told to 
pick a password, the ones they choose are likely to be less secure than they think they are. This 
threat can be alleviated with more dissemination of educational security materials in a simple and 
engaging format, as well as the recommendation for students to use things like password 
managers, which can reduce self-security workload. The ultimate goal of any university trying to 
reign in insecure password use, however, is to implement 2-Factor Authentication, or to push it 
more aggressively if it hasn’t been widely adopted yet. 
The time of the password is nigh, or rather, has been. Yet, the world cannot shake the 
curse that is passwords, and they’ve only become more aggravating as the standards for them 
increase year after year. As a byproduct of this and other security efforts, a fatigue has set in and 
threatened to uproot many of the teachings of security professionals. Or perhaps not? Perhaps, at 
least in the case of determining the strength of passwords, fatigued and non-fatigued students 
alike have become disillusioned with the password’s supposed simplicity. This thesis has 
determined that, among a student population, security fatigue has no clear impact on their 
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perceptions of password strength. Rather, students from both sides of the aisle give credit where 
it is not due, thinking highly of passwords that should never be used in modern times. This may 
thus show that, in a limited context that should be carefully applied elsewhere, security fatigue 
may not be an impactful factor in why people choose insecure passwords. 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent 
INFORMED CONSENT 
 
Security Fatigue and its Effects on Perceived Password Strength Among University Students 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study about the effects of the “security fatigue” 
phenomenon on how students view the strength of passwords. This study is being conducted by Chase 
Carroll (csy385@mocs.utc.edu, (731)468-4818) with support from thesis director David Schwab (David-
schwab@utc.edu) at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.   
 
The questionnaire(s) will take about 6 minutes to complete.  
 
This survey is anonymous. Do not indicate your name on the survey. No identifiable information will be 
gathered through the questions in this survey or automatically by QuestionPro, and all responses will be 
kept secure in a digital format according to relevant data storage standards. No one will be able to identify 
you or your answers, and no one will know whether or not you participated in the study. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. By selecting "Yes" below you are voluntarily agreeing to 
participate and you are acknowledging that you are 18 years of age or older. You are free to stop 
answering questions at any time or to decline to answer any particular question you do not wish to answer 
for any reason. If you are younger than 18, do not proceed. 
 
Research at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga involving human participants is carried out 
under the oversight of the Institutional Review Board. Address questions or problems regarding these 
58 | P a g e  
 
activities to Dr. Susan Davidson, UTC IRB Chair, email: susan-davidson@utc.edu; phone: (423) 425-
5568. 
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Appendix B: Survey Questions 
Section 1: Fatigue-targeting Questions 
What makes a strong password? Do NOT provide examples, only give your opinion. 
What is your opinion on password complexity requirements? 
What are your feelings about mandated password changes? 
Is password strength/complexity a concern for you? Why or why not? 
Do you always adhere to password complexity guidelines? Why or why not? 
Section 2: Password Strength Perception Questions 
 Very Weak Weak Average Strong Very Strong 
asdfghjkl1      
YAgjecc826       
babygurl1       
Francesco       
1v7Upjw3nT       
P@ssw0rd      
vC3qqeA1       
234dak61      
pE3^&zSx"DP       
>7ncZm      
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